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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
"Property" Under Due Process-
Non-Tenured Teachers' Right to Re-Employment
Robert Sindermann was a non-tenured teacher in a Texas state college system
for ten years, the last four of which he spent at Odessa Junior College under
a series of one-year contracts. Mounting friction between the Board of Regents
and Professor Sindermann' culminated in the Board's decision in May 1969
not to renew the professor's contract. Professor Sindermann was given no
statement of the official reasons for the decision and no opportunity for a
hearing to challenge them. In an action filed in the United States District
Court, Sindermann claimed that the Regents' decision infringed upon his first
amendment right to free speech and that the denial of a hearing violated his
fourteenth amendment right to due process. The district court rendered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Regents.4 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded for a development of the facts at
full trial, opining that regardless of his lack of tenure Sindermann's expectancy
interest in continued employment entitled him to an opportunity for a hearing
with certain minimum procedural accoutrements.'
David Roth was hired for his first teaching job by Wisconsin State Univer-
sity-Oshkosh.' He claimed his one-year contract was not renewed because of
certain criticisms he had leveled at the university. In accordance with university
rules governing non-tenured teachers, no official reasons were stated, nor was
Roth given an opportunity for a hearing." In an action filed in the United States
District Court he alleged violations of his rights to free speech and procedural
due process. The district court granted Roth summary judgment on the pro-
cedural question and ordered the Board of Regents to state their reasons for
dismissal and provide Roth a hearing.! The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the adverse effect non-retention was
' Odessa Junior College had no tenure system under Texas law. Law of June 18, 1967,
ch. 745, [1967] Tex. Laws 2012 (formerly TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.201-.216, now TEX.
EDuC. CODE §§ 13.001-.116 (1972)).
'Professor Sindermann was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Asso-
ciation in his last year with the college and in that capacity, on several occasions, he made
unauthorized sorties from his professorial duties on campus to testify before the Texas
Legislature. In addition, he became increasingly involved in public disputes with the col-
lege's Regents over existing policies. Notably, he openly advocated elevation of the co4lege
to four-year status in opposition to the Regents and went so far as to run a newspaper ad
ridiculing the Regents' position.
' The Board did issue a press release just prior to its decision, describing the deteriorated
relationship with Professor Sindermann and charging him with insubordination for fla-
grantly defying college officials' refusals to grant him permission to leave classes to testify
before the Texas Legislature.
4The unreported conclusions of the district court were noted by the court of appeals:
"I. Plaintiff has no cause of action against the Defendants since his contract of employment
terminated May 31, 1969, and Odessa Junior College has not adopted the tenure system.
• * * IV. Defendants have not violated any constitutional rights of the Plaintiff." Sindermann
v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 942 n.7 (5th Cit. 1970).5 Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cit. 1970).
GAct of Dec. 20, 1965, ch. 497, § 1, [1965] Wis. Laws 779 (amended 1969) provided
that "[a)ll teachers in any state university shall initially be employed on probation. The
employment shall be permanent, during efficiency and good behavior after 4 years of con-
tinuous service in the state university system as a teacher."
7Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 n.4 (1972).
'Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
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likely to have on Roth's career to outweigh any government interest, to the
extent that "affording the professor a glimpse at the reasons and a minimal
opportunity to test them is an appropriate protection."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases." Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), was held, affirmed: A lack of either con-
tractual or tenurial right to re-employment is irrelevant to a claimed violation
of the first amendment; and a teacher's claim of entitlement to continued em-
ployment based upon rules and mutual understandings comprising an unwrit-
ten "common law" of a university is a property interest more than mere
"expectancy" and protected by due process under the fourteenth amendment.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), was held, reversed and re-
manded: A teacher whose probationary contract is not renewed by a university
and whose freedom to seek other employment is not thereby impaired has no
property or liberty interest protected by due process under the fourteenth
amendment.
I. DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
A. Right Versus Privilege
No state may deprive any person of his interest in life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Potentially subject to broad interpretation,"2 this
constitutional requirement that protected interests fall into one of three cate-
gories was further restricted by the rule, apparently a product of Holmesian
jurisprudence," that "[dlue process of law is not applicable unless one is
being deprived of something to which he has a right," as opposed to a mere
privilege. 4 This distinction between "right" and "privilege" has not proved
to be a viable basis for extension of due process protection."3 The application
'Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1971).
"°Perry v. Sindermann, 403 U.S. 917 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, 404 U.S. 909
(1971).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
22 Interpretation of the fourteenth amendment, like the entire Constitution, is not limited
to the original context of enactment. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
"In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892),
Justice Holmes spoke for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court: "The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man." This and other observations by Justice Holmes are taken to have originated the
right-privilege distinction. Anything provided gratuitously is a privilege. See Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439
(1968).
"
4 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-
Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L. REv. 193, 224 (1956):
The typical thinking is that one has no 'right' to a government gratuity,
that one who has no 'right' at stake should not be entitled to a hearing, that
in the absence of a 'right' one should not even be entitled to judicial re-
view of an administrative denial of the gratuity or privilege, that due process
protects only 'life, liberty, or property' and not privileges, and that therefore
courts are not called upon to require fair hearings when nothing more than
privileges are at stake.
'" "Partly because most benefits could be defined by a sympathetic and imaginative
court as 'life, liberty, or property' and partly because the arbitrary or capricious denial of
any benefit conferred by the government on similarly situated individuals smacks of a denial
of equal protection, the power and persuasiveness of the privilege doctrine is waning




of such one-word labels is not determinative of the due process question, but
is rather dependent upon an antecedent analysis of the situation presented.
Only after the situation has been analyzed and the applicability of due process
determined can the label "right" or "privilege" be applied. A declaration that
an interest is a right automatically invokes due process protection; but under-
lying this declaration, and providing its foundation, is a prior evaluation of
the interest itself. Since "right" means only an interest protected by due process,
its use is a tautology: the protection of due process of law applies only to an
interest protected by due process (in other words, a right).
Rather than abolish the distinction between right and privilege, the Court
has used three means of circumventing it.'" First, the ordinarily understood
meanings of the words have been distorted to work the desired result.' Second,
a separate interest has been found which, when joined with the privilege,
merited the extension of due process protection. 8 Third, the distinction has
been totally ignored." After such tortured treatment, the Court finally rejected
the right-privilege doctrine, though without overruling the case through which
it became law." Unfettered by either irrelevant tradition or impossible dis-
tinctions, the terms "property" and "liberty" are thus free to provide assurance
that government will be fair." Any deprivation without due process of an
interest in either liberty" or property,' thus conceived, is prohibited by the
fourteenth amendment.
B. Procedural Requirements
Only after a constitutional interest in life, liberty, or property has been
established must the precise procedural safeguards required to protect that
"See Davis, supra note 14, at 225.
" Mail service and even second-class rates, privileges in common parlance, are consti-
tutionally protected rights rather than privileges. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146,
156 (1946); United States ex 'el. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 433 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
" For example, freedom from a "badge of infamy" is a legal right which, when found
together with the privilege of government employment, dictates the application of due
process to both. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952).
" In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), the majority
disposed of the case without mention of the distinction, refusing to counter the minority's
charge that they had overlooked an important rule of law.
"'Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971): "But this Court has rejected
the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is charac-
terized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' " See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
1 Liberty is more than freedom from bodily restraint, and property is more than tangi-
bles. " 'Liberty' and 'property' are broad and majestic terms. They are among the '[glreat
[constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience ....
[T]hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who
founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged.'"
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972), citing National Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
2 "Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision,
that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends
to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be re-
stricted except for a proper governmental objective." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
""The Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 'property,' however, has never been
interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership. Rather, it has been read
broadly to extend protection to 'any significant property interest,' . . . including statutory
entitlements." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
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interest be determined. 4 "Whether any procedural protections are due depends
on the extent to which an individual will be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss.' "' The "fundamental requisite of due process" is the right to be heard,"6
although this right, while basic, is far from absolute. 7 The existence of the
right and any concomitant procedural requirements depends on a balancing
of the individual's interest against that of the state. 8
A balancing test is used to compare the extent of the injury to the individual
relative to the interest of the state in the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens." If, at the hand of government, the individual suffers a substantial'
or grievous" loss, an infringement of a fundamental right,' or a loss due to
arbitrary government action,' then a hearing is required.
II. DUE PROCESS AND THE NEW PROPERTY 4
"ITIhe emergence of government as a major source of wealth" has had a
"4 "Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). "[Consideration of what pro-
cedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of
the private interest that has been affected by the governmental action." Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
"Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The re-
quirement of "grievous loss" serves to qualify the property, liberty, or life interest involved.
Since "property," for example, could be read to include almost any beneficial interest in
any tangible thing or intangible activity, the requirement of "grievous loss" limits the
property interest to a substantial one. The expansion of the meaning of "property" is thus
partially restricted. Nevertheless, the meaning of "grievous loss" is not impervious to change,
and correspondingly as it is broadened the extent of "property" is likewise broadened.
'"Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 For example, cases involving national security pose an exception. See Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Central Union Trust
Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921).
28 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
"[Dlue process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest
of overriding significance, persons . . . must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
50 "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
"Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
"A common example of a possible first amendment violation requiring due process
protection is where a teacher or other government employee is discharged for association
with the Communist Party or other "subversive organizations." See Connell v. Higgen-
botham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
"Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359
U.S. 535 (1959).
"[C)onstitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
192 (1952). See also Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 678 (2d Cir. 1966). But cf.
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 901 (1961) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
" "New property" was coined by Professor Charles A. Reich to refer to the extended
range of interests that must come under fourteenth amendment protection due to increased
government influence on society. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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profound effect upon this society and its laws." Because people have come to
depend upon many governmental benefits and services, the imposition of undue
restrictions upon government largess has been held in many cases to be un-
constitutional. "
Government employment, traditionally regarded as another form of such
largess, has long been denied legal protection. 7 There is, of course, no right to
continued government employment." But "[to state that a person does not
have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say that he
must comply with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down
by the proper authorities.""8 Discharge from a government job in a manner
that brands the former employee with a "badge of infamy," precluding him
from further government employment, may severely restrict his job market,
thereby depriving him of his liberty to work."0 Also, discharge from a govern-
ment job may deprive the employee of his property interest in his employment
and salary."' Therefore, discharge from a government job without the benefit
to the employee of procedural safeguards, such as notice of reasons for the
discharge, a hearing, and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine wit-
nesses, may violate procedural due process.'5 If nothing more, due process pro-
tects against discharge which is violative of the employee's constitutional
rights' or is patently arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory."
The problem of constitutional protection of government employment has
been particularly acute in the field of higher education, due to administrators'
attempts to control the philosophies and teachings of state educators and edu-
cators' lack of protectable interests in continued employment.' The Supreme
35Id.
8Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535 (1971) (driver's license); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce
action in pauperis); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967)
(civilian job on defense facility); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemploy-
ment); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (license to
practice law); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (tax exemption); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (license to practice law); Hannegan v.
Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (second-class mail permit).
37 "A public office is not property within the constitutional guaranty." 2 T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 746 n.1 (8th ed. 1927) (citing cases).
38 See note 13 supra.
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
'See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). See also Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Peters v. Hobby,
349 U.S. 331, 347 (1955).
41 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
4 5Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956).43 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961). But cf. American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
"[Clonstitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pur-
suant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 192 (1952). See also Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672, 678 (2d Cir. 1966).
But cf. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 901 (1961)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
43Dealing with the issue of evolution in Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W.
363, 365 (1927), one court went so far as to claim that "[iun dealing with its own em-
ployees engaged upon its own work, the state is not hampered by . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
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Court has recognized the importance of academic freedom and on the basis of
substantive due process has struck down attempts to condition employment on
requirements violative of it." The Court also extended the protection of sub-
stantive due process to the situation in which school administrators merely
allowed a probationary teacher's one-year contract to lapse for stated reasons
which violated the teacher's constitutional rights, regardless of the teacher's
lack of contractual or tenurial right to re-employment."7 But where adminis-
trators have allowed a teacher's contract to lapse without stating the official
reasons, thus presenting no substantive due process issue, the Supreme Court
has been silent and the courts of appeals have been in conflict regarding the
requirements of procedural due process. The Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
have held that in the absence of contractual or tenurial rights the teacher has
no interest protectable by procedural due process, and, therefore, the reasons
for dismissal need not be stated nor a hearing granted." The First, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits have held that the teacher's interest in re-employment is sub-
stantial, requiring procedural safeguards."
III. THE BOUNDARIES OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PROTECTION
In Perry v. SindermannW the Supreme Court found the possible presence of
an interest protected by due process. Having been employed by the Texas
state college system for ten years, Professor Sindermann had a form of job
tenure under guidelines promulgated by the Coordinating Board of the Texas
College and University System.5' The court of appeals denominated Sinder-
mann's possible interest in re-employment an "expectancy" requiring due
process protection." The Supreme Court expressly rejected this classification,
stating that even though no property interest at all was needed to raise the
issue of violation of freedom of speech," a mere "expectancy" would not be
protected by procedural due process. 4 Instead, the Court pointed to the pos-
sibility of an unwritten "common law" of a university based upon unofficial
rules and guidelines and unwritten agreements and understandings." It held
that proof of such a common law, even in the absence of contractual and
tenurial rights, while it would not entitle Sindermann to reinstatement, would
constitute a property interest under the fourteenth amendment and thereby
entitle him to notice of the reasons for his dismissal and a hearing at which he
4 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234
(1957).
4'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
4 8 0rr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 943 (1972);
Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970);
Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
843 (1969).49 Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cit. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
972 (1971); Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 593
(1972).
50408 U.S. 593 (1972).
51 Id. at 600 n.6, 600-01.
G'Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943-44 (5th Cit. 1970).
5"See note 45 supra.
51408 U.S. at 603.
51 Id. at 602.
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could challenge those reasons. Since the district court's summary judgment for
the Regents denied Sindermann the chance to prove his property interest, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals remanding the case to the
district court.
Board of Regents v. Roth,' decided the same day, presented the Court with
a slightly different situation. Neither Wisconsin statute nor the rules prom-
ulgated by the Board of Regents provided any procedural protection to a
teacher employed on probation whose one-year contract was merely allowed
to lapse.' The Regents' reasons for refusing to renew Roth's contract were
never stated, yet on the basis of the surrounding circumstances-Roth had
engaged in campus disturbances and controversies concerning the university
administration and had been openly critical of the Board of Regents-Roth
alleged violations of his rights to free speech and due process. The district
court applied the balancing test and was compelled to the conclusion "that
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the decision not
to retain a professor employed by a state university may not rest on a basis
wholly unsupported in fact, or on a basis wholly without reason."58 The Su-
preme Court, however, looked to the nature of Roth's interest, rather than its
weight relative to the state's interest." His contractual rights having lapsed, his
tenurial rights nonexistent, his liberty of employment unimpaired, and his
allegation of free speech violations unproved," the Court could find no interest
which could be classified as liberty or property under the fourteenth amend-
ment. It thus reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the
court of appeals for further proceedings.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented from the Court's dis-
position of Perry and its judgment in Roth. Both Sindermann and Roth, they
felt, were entitled to summary judgments. In Roth Justice Douglas argued that
first amendment freedoms are so important, especially in the academic com-
munity, that a charge that they have been violated in the nonrenewal of a
government employment contract automatically requires an examination of
the constitutionality of the reasons for the nonrenewal. "Without a statement
of the reasons for the discharge and an opportunity to rebut those reasons-
both of which were refused by petitioners-there is no means short of a law-
suit to safeguard the right not to be discharged for the exercise of First Amend-
ment guarantees."'" For Justice Douglas, the sanctity of the first amendment
and the possibility that it might be infringed required that the university pro-
vide Roth with a statement of the reasons for the nonrenewal and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing." It is suggested that Justice Douglas' arguments are mis-
58408 U.S. 564 (1972).
"'Act of Dec. 20, 1965, ch. 497, § 1, £1965] Wis. Laws 779 (amended 1969); 408
U.S. 564, 567 n.4 (1972).5' 310 F. Supp. 972, 979 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
51408 U.S. at 570-71.60 The district court's summary judgment on the procedural issue precluded trial on the
first amendment issue. The Court did not deny him the right to raise that issue because
of his lack of contract or tenure, but expressly limited review to the procedural question.
408 U.S. at 569. The Court held in Perry that the substantive issue could be raised regard-




placed. The issue before the Court was whether there existed an interest pro-
tected by due process, and not whether Roth's freedom of speech had been
infringed."
Justice Marshall found the fourteenth amendment concepts of "liberty"
and "property" unduly restricted by the majority decision.
In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it
unless the government can establish some reason for denying the employ-
ment. This is the 'property' right that I believe is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and that cannot be denied 'without due process of law.' And it is
also liberty-liberty to work-which is the 'very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity' secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."
In fact, Roth demonstrated no infringement upon his liberty to seek other
employment, and none was found. Moreover, it would seem that Justice
Marshall's definition of "property" does not comport with the ordinary mean-
ing of the word. The complete lack of contractual, tenurial, or other rightful
interest prevents the existence of property protected by due process.
Under Perry and Roth the scope of property interests under the fourteenth
amendment has been enlarged to include a non-tenured teacher's interest in
contract renewal if it is the practice of the state school to renew such con-
tracts."' Such an interest is not a mere expectancy but a claim of right. But
because of the necessity of remanding Perry, the elements of proof of Sinder-
mann's interest, the establishment of a university common law and the demon-
stration of a breach thereof, remain undetermined. At least the possibility of
such an interest exists where the teacher, like Sindermann, has taught for a
sufficiently lengthy period. It is also clear from Roth that a teacher who has
taught for only one year, with the express understanding that renewal would
be solely at the Regents' discretion, cannot make a claim of right to re-employ-
ment. The bounds of the "new property" have been narrowed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perry and Roth adjudicated procedural issues only; indiscreet grants of sum-
mary judgment by the respective district courts prevented the Supreme Court's
consideration of the substantive first amendment claims. While the substance
vacuum was unfortunate in that it prevented the Court from tying procedural
requirements to specific violations of constitutionally protected rights, it did
point to the inadequacies of judicial review of termination of government em-
ployment contracts absent an official statement of the reasons therefor.
Concluding the majority opinion in Roth, Justice Stewart wrote: "Our an-
alysis of the respondent's constitutional rights in this case in no way indicates
a view that an opportunity for a hearing or a statement of reasons for non-
retention would, or would not, be appropriate or wise in public colleges and
universities. For it is a written Constitution that we apply. Our role is confined
"3 See note 60 supra.
"408 U.S. at 588-89.
'In his concurring opinion in Perry Chief Justice Burger emphasized that the four-
teenth amendment issues in Perry and Roth depended upon state law. 408 U.S. at 603.
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